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ABSTRACT
Multiagent coordination in cooperative multiagent systems (MASs)
has been widely studied in both fixed-agent repeated interaction
setting and the static social learning framework. However, two
aspects of dynamics in real-world multiagent scenarios are cur-
rently missing in existing works. First, the network topologies can
be dynamic where agents may change their connections through
rewiring during the course of interactions. Second, the game ma-
trix between each pair of agents may not be static and usually not
known as a prior. Both the network dynamic and game uncertainty
increase the coordination difficulty among agents. In this paper,
we consider a multiagent dynamic social learning environment in
which each agent can choose to rewire potential partners and inter-
act with randomly chosen neighbors in each round. We propose an
optimal rewiring strategy for agents to select most beneficial peers
to interact with for the purpose of maximizing the accumulated
payoff in repeated interactions. We empirically demonstrate the
effectiveness and robustness of our approach through comparing
with benchmark strategies. The performance of three representa-
tive learning strategies under our social learning framework with
our optimal rewiring is investigated as well.
KEYWORDS
Multiagent coordination; Social learning; Rewiring; Reinforcement
learning
1 INTRODUCTION
Multiagent coordination in cooperative multiagent systems (MASs)
is a significant and widely studied problem in the literature. In
cooperative MASs, the agents share common interests defined by
the same reward functions [28]. This requires the agents to have
the capability of coordinating with each other effectively towards
desirable outcomes.
Until now, a lot of research efforts have been devoted to ad-
dressing multiagent coordination problems in cooperative MASs
[6, 19, 21–23, 25]. One class of research focuses on coordination is-
sues in fixed-agent repeated interaction settings. Claus and Boutilier
Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2018), M. Dastani, G. Sukthankar, E. Andre, S. Koenig (eds.), July 2018, Stockholm,
Sweden
© 2018 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/doi
[6] firstly proposed two representative learning strategies - Inde-
pendent Learner (IL) and Joint-Action Learner (JAL) to investigate
their coordination performance in repeated two-agent cooperative
games. Later a number of improved strategies [19, 21, 22, 25] have
been proposed to achieve coordination more efficiently and over-
come the noise introduced by the high mis-coordination cost and
stochasticity of games. Matignon et al. [23] extensively investigate
the comparative performance of existing independent strategies
in terms of their coordination efficiency in two-agent repeated
cooperative games. Their results show that perfect coordination
can hardly be achieved for fully stochastic games. However, in
practical complex environments, the interactions between agents
can be sparse, i.e., it is highly likely that each agent may not have
global access and only have the opportunity to interact with local
neighbors. Moreover, agent’s interacting partners are not fixed and
may change frequently and randomly. For example, in social media
[10], it is commonly accepted that the user attention span is lim-
ited, hence it is of great importance to identify interactions that
have optimal rewards. Thereby, another line of research focuses
on investigating the question of how a population of cooperative
agents can effectively coordinate among each other under the social
learning framework [1, 15–17, 24, 28, 29, 32]. For example, Hao and
Leung [17] extend IL and JAL into the social learning framework
and find that better coordination performance can be achieved by
leveraging the observation mechanism.
Most of existing works under the social learning framework
assume that agents are located in a static network. During each
round of interaction, each agent plays the same cooperative game
with a randomly selected partners from its neighborhood. How-
ever, two important aspects of dynamics in real-world multiagent
scenarios are currently missing. First, the cooperative games might
be different for different pairs of agents due to a variety of reasons
(e.g., the difference of agents’ capabilities and preferences, and the
difference of interaction timing and locations) in practical scenarios.
For example, in sensor networks [33], the overlapping scanning
areas of each pair of sensors are of various importance and different
rewards are obtained when specific scanning areas are coordinated
between two senor agents. Another example is that in negotiation
domain [4], an agent may have different preferences on each offer
provided by different opponents. Therefore, in this paper, we relax
this assumption by assuming that the payoff matrix between each
pair of agents is different which is generated from certain proba-
bility distribution, and the payoff information is unknown before
their interaction.
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Second, the network topologies can be dynamic. For example in
social networks [11, 20], it is common that users follow and unfol-
low other users on their own initiative due to individual preference
and interest. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a dynamic envi-
ronment where each agent is given the opportunities to change its
connections through rewiring to interact with agents which may
bring higher payoffs during the course of interactions. The rewiring
mechanism has been previously used to explore indirect reciprocity
[27] or cope with cheaters [13] to promote cooperations among
agents in non-cooperative environments such as Donation games.
In contrast, in this paper, we focus on cooperative environments
where agents can utilize the rewiring mechanism to increase their
benefits in long-run interactions by breaking connections to bad-
performance neighbors and replacing them with new connections.
In this work, during each round, each agent goes through two
main phases: the rewiring phase and the interaction phase. In the
rewiring phase, each agent is likely to be given the opportunity
to alter their connections through rewiring for higher payoffs in
future interactions. The key problem here is how to compute the
optimal rewiring strategy to maximize the long-run interaction
payoff against the network dynamics. To make efficient rewiring
decisions, each agent has to take two aspects of uncertainties into
consideration, i.e., the uncertainties of opponents’ behaviors and
the payoff matrix with unknown peers. To this end, we model an
agent’s rewiring problem as a sequential decision-making problem
and propose an optimal rewiring approach for agents to select most
beneficial peers among all reachable agents. In the interaction phase,
agents learn their policies from pair-wise interactions through play-
ing certain cooperative game against randomly selected opponent
from its neighborhood. Empirical results show that our optimal
rewiring strategy outperforms other existing benchmark strategies
in terms of agents’ average accumulated payoff and robustness
against different environments. Besides, the relative performance
of three representative learning strategies (i.e., Fictitious Play, Joint-
Action Learner and Joint-Action WoLF-PHC) is analyzed as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we give an overview of related works. In Section 3, we give a formal
description of our coordination problem in dynamic cooperative
MASs. In Section 3, the social learning framework and both rewiring
and learning strategies are described. In Section 4, we empirically
demonstrate the efficiency of our rewiring approach and analyze
the influence of three learning strategies under the social learning
framework with rewiring. Lastly conclusion and future work are
given in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
There has been a large amount of research in the multiagent re-
inforcement learning literature on solving coordination problem
in cooperative MASs One line of research focuses on solving co-
ordination problem in fixed-agent repeated interaction settings
[6, 19, 21–23, 25, 26]. Claus and Boutilier [6] investigate the coor-
dination performance of the Independent Learner and the Joint-
Action learner, in the context of repeated two-agent cooperative
games. It shows that both types of learners achieve success in
simple cooperative games. Lauer and Riedmiller [21] propose the
distributed Q-learning algorithm base on the optimistic assump-
tion. It is proved that optimal joint actions can be guaranteed to
achieve if the cooperative game is deterministic. FMQ heuristic
[19] and recursive FMQ [22] are proposed to alter the Q-value es-
timation function to handle the stochasticity of the games. FMQ
obtains success in partially stochastic climbing games but still can
not achieve satisfactory performance in fully stochastic cooperative
games. Panait et al. [26] propose the lenient multiagent learning
algorithm to overcome the noise introduced by the stochasticity of
the games. The results show that coordination on the optimal joint
action can be achieved in more than 93.5% of the runs in the fully
stochastic climbing game. Matignon et al. [23] review all existing
independent multiagent reinforcement learning algorithms and
evaluate and discuss their strength and weakness. It shows that
all of them fail to achieve perfect coordination for fully stochastic
games and only recursive FMQ can achieve coordination for 58%
of the runs.
The other line of research considers the multiagent coordination
problem under the social learning framework [1, 15–17, 24, 28, 29,
32], where agents learn through pair-wise interactions by playing
the same game. Sen and Airiau [28] propose the social learning
model and investigate the emergence of consistent coordination
policies (norms) inMASs (e.g., conflicting-interest games) under this
social learning framework. Hao and Leung [17] investigate the mul-
tiagent coordination problems in cooperative environments under
the social learning framework. They demonstrate individual action
learners (IALs) and joint action learners (JALs) and achieve better
coordination performance by leveraging the observation mecha-
nism. Most of previous works assume that agents learn through
playing the same cooperative game with randomly selected part-
ners from their neighborhood within a static network. In contrast,
in this paper, we consider a dynamic environment in which agents
learn through pair-wise interactions through playing uniquely and
randomly generated cooperative games.
There are some existing works on using rewiring mechanism to
support cooperation in social networks [9, 13, 14, 27]. Peleteiro et al.
[27] propose a new mechanism based on three main pillars: indirect
reciprocity, coalitions and rewiring, to improve cooperation among
self-interested agents placed in a complex network. Rewiring, as
a part of the proposed mechanism, alters the worst social links
with the best coalition members the neighbors’ reputation coali-
tions information. They confirm that the use of rewiring indeed
improves cooperation when they play the donation game in their
social scenario. Griffiths and Luck [13] present and demonstrate
a decentralised tag-based mechanism to support cooperation in
the presence of cheaters without requiring reciprocity. The simple
rewiring enables agents to change their neighbour connections, in
particular by removing connections to the worst neighbours and
replacing them with connections to neighbours with whom others
have had positive experiences. Their results show that cooperation
can be improved by enabling agents to change their neighbour
connections. In contrast, in this paper, we consider the multiagent
coordination problem in cooperative MASs and how rewiring can
increase the benefits of individual agents during long-run interac-
tions under the social learning framework.
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3 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a population N of agents, each of which has (bidirec-
tional) connections to its neighbors. We use Oi to denote agent
i’s neighborhood, such that each agent i is only able to interact
with its neighbors inOi . We model the strategic interaction among
each pair of agents as a cooperative game, where each agent always
receives the same payoff under the same outcome. One example of
deterministic two-action cooperative games is shown in Fig.1(a), in
which there exist two optimal Nash equilibria. In this game, agents
are desired to coordinate their actions towards a consistent Nash
equilibrium to maximize their benefits.
Previous works [15, 17, 18, 23, 26] have investigated the problem
of how a population of agents could achieve coordination under the
same cooperative environments (games) to maximize the system’s
overall benefits. However, in general, the payoffmatrix between any
pair of agents may be different depending on the agents’ interacting
environments. Following the setting in [8], we assume that each
game is drawn independently from certain probability distribution
to model agents’ interaction environments in a generalized way.
Without loss of generality, a general form of 2-action cooperative
gameG ji between agent i and j is shown in Fig.1(b), where the value
of ua (or ub ) is sampled from a stochastic variable xa (or xb ) fol-
lowing certain cumulative probability distribution Fa (x) (or Fb (x)),
and α < xa (xb ) represents the payoff under mis-coordination. The
payoff matrix of any pair of agents is not known as a prior, which
can be learned through repeated interactions. In our settings, we
assume that each agent in the environment can observe the actions
of its interaction neighbor at the end of each interaction.
Inspired from human society [11, 20], agents should have the
freedom of choosing whom they want to interact with. Thus, in
this paper, we consider that the underlying interaction topology is
dynamic: agents are allowed to break existing connections which
they do not benefit from and establish new connections with non-
neighbor agents through rewiring. Each rewiring is associate with
certain cost and we use c ji to denote the rewiring cost of agent i
when it establishes new connection with another agent j. As in
many scenarios, agents usually do not have access to all agents in
the environment but only local access due to physical limitations,
e.g. the distance of signal reception and delivery, the radius of
human relation circle [7, 20]. Hence it is not feasible to allow each
agent to be able to rewire any other agents in the environments,
and here we assume that each agent is only allowed to establish
connections with the set of reachable peers, which can be defined as
the set of agents within certain distance of agent i . We use {Oi ∪O¯i }
to denote agent i’s reachable peers, consisting of Oi for agent i’s
neighborhood and O¯i for all non-neighbor agents that agent i can
potentially interact with through rewiring.
Moreover, unlimited increase of communication in real-world
networks is usually impractical and the number of connections
should have a upper bound due to finite connection resources [33].
Each agent should break an old connection each time it decides to
establish a new connection through rewiring.1 The interest of any
rational agent is to maximize its accumulative payoff during the
course of interactions. Therefore, a rational agent needs to balance
1This can be easily extended to the case of allowing multiple rewiring by ranking the
expected payoff of reachable peers in the descending order.
a
b
a
b
10
0
0
10
(a)
a
b
a
b
u
α
α
u
a
b
(b)
Figure 1: (a) An instance of cooperative games. (b) A general
form of a cooperative game.
the tradeoff between rewiring to explore more beneficial partners
to interact with and exploiting the current connected neighbors to
avoid rewiring cost.
4 SOCIAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK
Under the social learning framework, there is a population N of
agents and each agent learns its policy through repeated pair-wise
interactions with its neighbors. The initial neighborhood of each
agent is determined by the underlying topology and three repre-
sentative topologies are considered here: Regular Network, Small-
world Network, Scale-Free Network [2, 30]. The overall interaction
flow under the social learning framework is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Overall interaction protocol under the social learning
framework for each agent i ∈ N
1: for a number of interaction rounds do
2: if random variable p ≤ φ then
3: Perform rewiring action.
4: end if
5: Play game G ji with randomly chosen player j ∈ Oi .
6: Obtain payoff and update its policy.
7: Update neighbor j’s action model.
8: end for
During each round, each agent i first is given the opportunity
of rewiring with probability φ. During the rewiring phase, agent i
breaks its connection with a neighbor with poor-performance and
establishes a new connection with another agent from its potential
partners O¯i (Line 2-4). Next, in interaction phase, agent i interacts
with a randomly selected neighbor agent j from its neighborhood
Oi by playing their corresponding cooperative game G ji (Line 5).
After the interaction, agent i and j receive the corresponding payoff
and update their policies and opponents’ models respectively (Line
6-7). The details of the rewiring and learning strategies will be
introduced in following subsection.
4.1 An Optimal Rewiring Strategy
The goal of rewiring is to explore the set of unconnected peers
(potential partners O¯) in the population and seek more beneficial
partners to interact with. Each agent is faced with two aspects of
uncertainties: the uncertainty of the behaviors of its neighbors and
unknown peers; the uncertainty of the payoff matrix during inter-
action with unknown peers. To select the optimal agent to rewire,
we need to evaluate the potential benefits of interacting with agent
j by taking the aforementioned uncertainties into consideration.
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Before making a rewiring decision, each agent first needs to
evaluate the benefits of interacting with each neighbor. One natural
way is to use the optimistic assumption, i.e., computing the expected
payoff of selecting different actions based on the estimated policy
of a neighbor and picking the action with the highest expected
value. In other words, agent i evaluates the expected payoff v ji of
interacting with agent j ∈ Oi by using the highest expected payoff
that can be received among all possible actions Ai . Formally we
have:
v
j
i = maxm∈Aj
p
j
i (m)um +
(
1 − p ji (m)
)
α , (1)
where um represents the explicit payoff when both players choose
actionm by sampling xm from Fm (x) during historic interactions,
and α is for the mis-coordination payoff. p ji (m) denotes agent i’s
estimated probability of agent j choosing actionm. The value of
p
j
i (m) can be easily obtained as the empirical frequency distribu-
tion of agent j’s actions based on historical interactions and other
advanced techniques such as weighting more on recent experiences
may also be considered. Provided there is no need to rewire, we
use agent i’s worst-case expected payoff among all the neighbors
as its baseline utility. Formally we have:
v∗i (Oi ) = minj ∈Oi v
j
i . (2)
For each unknown potential partner j ∈ O¯i to interact with,
agent i is faced with two aspects of uncertainties: agent j’s behav-
ior, and the payoff matrix G ji . For a previously unseen partner j’s
behavior, it can be estimated using the observed expected behaviors
from agent i’s existing neighborhood, while the payoff matrixG ji
has to be learned through repeated interactions after agent i and j
are connected through rewiring. Therefore, agent i’s estimation of
expected benefit x ji from interacting with an unknown agent j can
be formalized as follows:
x
j
i = maxm∈Aj
p¯
j
i (m)xm +
(
1 − p¯ ji (m)
)
α , (3)
where x ji is a stochastic variable and F
i
j (x) denotes the correspond-
ing cumulative distribution function of x ji , and α is the payoff under
mis-coordination. p¯ ji (m) is agent i’s estimated probability of agent
j choosing actionm within its neighborhood. As no interaction has
been made between agent i and the unknown peer j ∈ O¯i before,
the distribution over agent j’s actions can not be observed a prior
but estimated from the neighbors which once interact with agent j .
Intuitively, it is reasonable for agent i to establish new connection
with any unknown potential partner j if rewiring leads to higher
expected payoff. The difference between expected payoff x ji and
baseline value causes a incoming benefit which is promising to
pay back the rewiring cost c ji and to generate better payoffs in
further interactions. Otherwise, agent i should keep its current
neighborhood unchanged. During each rewiring phase, each agent
i has to unlink a bad-performance neighbor first before rewiring.
Note that there is no need for agent i to consider those agents
already disconnected during previous rewiring, since the expected
payoff of interacting with discarded agent j is obviously below the
current interaction baseline, i.e. v ji < v
∗
i (Oi ).
Each agent’s situated environments are continuously chang-
ing as it breaks old connections and establishes new ones, which
also influences the following interactions and rewiring decisions
thereafter. Therefore, each agent is actually faced with a sequential
rewiring decision-making problem. Formally, we propose model-
ing the above sequential rewiring problem for each agent i as an
Markov Decision Process (MDP),Mi =< Si ,Ai , Pi ,Ri > as follows:
• A finite set of states Si : each state ϵ of agent i can be repre-
sented as a tuple < O¯i ,yi >, in which O¯i describes the set
of potential partners of agent i and yi = v∗i (Oi ) is agent i’s
current baseline value.
• A finite set of actions Ai : agent i’s action set under ϵ is
Ai (ϵ) = {O¯i ,Null} which consists of actions of rewiring
with an agent in O¯i and the Null action for not rewiring.
• A transition function Pi : Pi (ϵ,a, ϵ ′) represents the probabil-
ity of reaching state ϵ ′ after taking action a under state ϵ .
The transition is probabilistic because the value of baseline
yi may change stochastically. If agent i rewires agent j ∈ O¯i ,
the new baseline y′i = v
∗
i (Oi ′) with the updated Oi ′ is deter-
mined by new included neighbor j and left neighbors after
breaking the worst-performing connection.
• A reward function Ri : Ri (ϵ,a) denotes the reward of execut-
ing action a under state ϵ , e.g., Ri (ϵ) = −c ji if agent i chooses
to rewire agent j and Ri (ϵ) = 0 if stops rewiring.
Under the above MDP formulation, our goal is to construct a
rewiring strategy πi (ϵ) specifying which new connection to estab-
lish, or to not rewire under each state ϵ . We start with a short-sight
version where each agent is only interested in maximizing its one-
shot payoff after rewiring. The utilityU (πi , ϵ) of a policy πi can be
defined recursively as follows,
U (πi , ϵ) =

∫ ∞
−∞U (πi , ϵ ′) dF ixπi (ϵ ) (x) if πi (ϵ) ∈ O¯i ,
−cπi (ϵ )i
yi otherwise stop.
(4)
where ϵ ′ =< O¯i\{πi (ϵ)},y′i } > denotes the new rewiring state
after agent πi (ϵ) is rewired, where y′i is the new expected baseline
payoff as the neighborhood Oi is altered.
Our final goal is to find an optimal policyπ∗i = arд maxπi U (πi , ϵ)
among all feasible policies, which considers the following: either
not rewire and obtain baseline yi , or rewire an unknown partner
j ∈ O¯i by sampling x from x ji at cost c
j
i , while taking the following
into account:
• x ≤ yi : this indicates the expected payoff interacting with
agent j is not better than its current baseline and x should be
the new baseline value after rewiring. Thus the expected util-
ity under state < O¯i ,yi > becomes−c ji +U (π∗i , < O¯i\{j},x >);
• x > yi : the expected payoff interacting with agent j is higher
than our baseline value. In this case, the expected utility
under state < O¯i ,yi > becomes −c ji +U (π∗i , < O¯i\{j},y′i >),
where y′i is the updated baseline value since agent i breaks
the connection with the worst-performance neighbor during
rewiring.
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The above way of formalizing the dynamics of an optimal strat-
egy only considers the one-shot interaction benefits. However, in
our social learning framework, each agent tries to maximize accu-
mulated payoffs during multi-rounds interactions. To this end, we
propose a new far-sight way of modeling our rewiring problem
such that each agent considers the accumulated expected payoff
through multiple interactions with any neighbor after rewiring. For-
mally, the K-step utility function UK (π∗i , ϵ) of an optimal strategy
π∗i must satisfy the following recursive relation:
UK (π∗i , ϵ) =min{Kyi , max
j ∈O¯i
{−c ji + UK (π∗i , < O¯i\{j},x >) · F ij (yi )
+
∫ ∞
x=yi
UK (π∗i , < O¯i\{j},y′i >) · dF ij (x)}},
(5)
where the rewiring sight value of K models an agent’s far-sight
degree by taking the accumulated payoff from K rounds of inter-
actions into account during each rewiring. We can see that Eq.5 is
essentially a Bellman equation, which could be solved by backward
induction in principle. However, even for a moderate-size MAS,
this approach quickly becomes intractable. To this end, we provide
a simple but optimal method to compute which agents to rewire or
not in O(n2) time (further explained later), which is inspired from
Pandora’s Rule2 [31].
Supposing that agent i has current baseline yi and a potential
partner j in O¯i , to determine whether to rewire partner j through
our K-sight optimal rewiring approach, we have:
• In the following K rounds, the expected interaction value
we could obtain from neighborhood Oi is at least:
Kyi . (6)
• If choose to rewire agent j, we could get a net benefit of
the following K-rounds interactions in the worst cases as
follows:
− c ji + K(
∫ yi
−∞
x dF ij (x) + yi ′
∫ ∞
yi
dF ij (x)). (7)
where yi ′ is the new baseline if x ≥ yi after breaking the
connection with old baseline one. We define yi ′ as yi ′ =
min{x ,yseci } where yseci is the second minimum expected
payoff in Oi given that agent i has at least two neighbors
before rewiring.3 Formally we have:
yi
′ =
∫ yseci
−∞
x dF ij (x) + yseci
∫ ∞
yseci
dF ij (x). (8)
• Further, we use Λ for the single-round payoff difference be-
tween not rewiring (Eq.6) and rewiring agent j (Eq.7) which
can be formalized as follows:
Λ =
∫ yi
−∞
x dF ij (x) + yi ′
∫ ∞
yi
dF ij (x) − yi − c ji /K . (9)
2Pandora’s Rule [31] is a solution concept for interaction under uncertainty; this
framework has a wide range of applications to dynamic alternative selection problems,
such as optimal service provider selection in Task-Procurement Problem [12], data
management [3] and optimal preference elicitation in negotiation [4].
3If agent i has only one neighbor, the new baseline degenerates to be y′i = x , which
is similar and simpler.
If Λ = 0, agent i is just indifferent between rewiring j and
not rewiring. Otherwise, the larger Λ value indicates that
agent j is more beneficial to rewire.
For each unknown partner j, the expected payoff satisfies the
cumulative distribution function F ij (x) and the rewiring cost is c
j
i .
We can calculate an index Λji through Eq.9, which fully captures
the relevant information about agent j: it should be rewired when it
has the highest positive index and exceeds the interaction baseline
of current neighborhood. It is proven in [31] that this strategy is
optimal in terms of expected reward Eq.5.
The overall K-sight rewiring strategy is shown in Algorithm 2.
At each rewiring phase, each agent i first calculates the baseline
interaction value yi and second minimum expected value yseci in
Oi (Line 1-6). Second, for each potential partnerw ∈ O¯i , its corre-
sponding index Λwi is computed following Eq.9 (Line 7-9). Finally,
agent i makes the rewiring decision accordingly — to rewire target
agent τ with the maximum value of Λmax at cost cτi if Λmax ≥ 0
or not to rewire otherwise (Line 10-15). Agent i unlinks the worst-
performing neighbor k before rewiring a new partner:
k = arд min
j ∈Oi
v
j
i . (10)
After certain rounds, each agent stops rewiring and converges to
an optimal neighborhood.
Algorithm 2 K-Sight rewiring strategy for agent i with sight K in
each rewiring phase
1: for each j ∈ Oi do
2: v ji = calculateExpectedReward(j);
3: end for
4: yi = minj ∈Oi v
j
i ;
5: k = arg minj ∈Oi v
j
i ;
6: yseci = minj ∈Oi \{k } v
j
i ;
7: for eachw ∈ O¯i do
8: Λwi = calculateK_SiдhtIndex(w,K ,yi ,yseci );
9: end for
10: Λmax = maxw ∈O¯i Λ
w
i ;
11: if Λmax ≥ 0 then
12: τ = arg maxw ∈O¯i Λ
w
i ;
13: UnlinkNeiдhbour (k);
14: RewirinдTarдet(τ );
15: end if
Next we analyze the computational complexity of our proposed
algorithm. In Algorithm 2, for each rewiring phase, agent i com-
putes the interaction baselines of current neighborhood Oi (Line
1-6) and the Λ value (Line 6-9) for each potential peer in O¯i to find
the optimal action (Line 10-15). This leads to a computational com-
plexity of O(n) and the value of n is for the size of reachable peers
{Oi ∪ O¯i }. Solving the Bellman equation (Eq.5) is equivalent with
calculating the optimal rewiring action for all feasible states which
are proportional to the size of potential peers. Thus the total com-
putational complexity of solving our sequential decision-making
problem is O(n2). Note that the computational complexity O(n2)
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can be quite low even when the population size N increases signifi-
cantly since the number of reachable peers for each agent is usually
much smaller than the number of agents in whole populations, i.e.
n = |O¯i | ≪ |N |.
After rewiring phase, each agent proceeds to interact with an
agent randomly selected from its neighborhood. We consider the
following three representative learning strategies in the literature
as agents’ learning strategies.
• Fictitious play(FP). FP is a well-known learning approach
in literature. Agent i keeps a frequency count of agent j’s
decisions from a history of past moves and assumes that the
opponent is playing a mixed strategy represented by this
frequency distribution. Agent i chooses the best-response
action m to that mixed strategy to maximize its expected
payoff. Formally we have:
m = arg max
m∈Aj
p
j
i (m)um +
(
1 − p ji (m)
)
α , (11)
where p ji (m) is agent i’s estimated distribution over agent j’s
actions and um is the payoff when both agent i and j choose
actionm, exactly the same in Eq.1.
• Joint Action Learner (JAL) [6]. JAL is a classic Multiagent
Reinforcement Learning algorithm under the assumptions
that each agent can observe the actions of other agents. A JAL
agent learns its Q-values for joint actions. Formally, Q ji (a,b)
represents agent i’s Q-value when agent i and j select action
a and b respectively. To determine the relative values of their
individual actions, agent i assumes that each other agent j
will choose actions in accordance with agent i’s empirical
distribution over agent j’s action. In general, agent i assesses
the expected value of each action a as follows:
EV (a) =
∑
m∈Aj
Q
j
i (a,m) p
j
i (m), (12)
where p ji (m) is agent i’s estimation for the probability of
agent j choosing actionm.
• Joint-Action WoLF-PHC (JA-WoLF).WoLF [5] extendsQ-learning
and learns mixed strategies with the idea of quickly adapting
when losing but being cautious when winning. Specifically
we modify WoLF to a Joint-Action version as agents can
observe others’ actions in our environments. We replace
Q(s,a) with Q(s, ®a) and each agent updates its Q-values for
each joint-action. In addition, to determine ’win’ or ’lose’,
we need to keep the frequency distribution over opponents’
actions., and agent i adjust its learning rate δ against agent
j as follows:
δ =

δw if
∑
a∈Ai π
j
i (a)
∑
m∈Aj Q
j
i (a,m)p
j
i (m)
≥ ∑a∈Ai π¯ ji (a)∑m∈Aj Q ji (a,m)p ji (m),
δl otherwise.
(13)
where δw and δl denotes the learning rate when win or lose
separately, π ji is agent i’s strategy and π¯
j
i is the average
strategy, and p ji (m) is the probability agent i maintains for
interacting with agent j.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our optimal rewiring
strategy with two benchmark strategies against various interac-
tion environments. Following that, we analyze the performance of
different learning strategies under our social learning framework.
5.1 Parameter Settings
We consider a population of hundreds of agents and three represen-
tative network topologies: regular network, small-world network
and scale-free network. In our experiments, there is no apparent
discrimination in results of these three initial topologies,4 and we
use regular networks as default choice for following illustration.
Besides, we consider a wide range of interaction environments
(x ,y, z) from three major aspects: the number of agents x , the size
of each agent’s initialized neighborhood y and the size of each
agent’s reachable agents z. For example, interaction environment
(100, 4, 12) denotes a scenario consisting of 100 agents which each
agent has 4 neighbors (O) and 12 reachable agents initially(O ∪ O¯).
In following experiments the value of neighborhood y are initial-
ized to be different constances equally for each agent. Note that
we put no limitation on the size of neighborhood and it can be
constance or other function forms to model the variance of agents’
connection capabilities. The set of reachable agents can also be
defined in different ways. For example, in [27] agents are allowed
to do the rewiring through leaving its worst neighbor and joins the
one with the highest score in its coalition. In contrast, in [13] an
agent replaces its bad-performance neighbors and replaces them
with specific agents from the neighborhood of its (best) neighbors.
We set the value of reachable agents size z to constances for the
purpose of generalization.
For each pair of agents i and j, the cooperative game G ji is
uniquely generated. The payoffs ua , ub on the diagonal of G
j
i are
sampled independently from xa , xb according to probability dis-
tribution Fa (x), Fb (x) which are separately set to either a uniform
distribution U (n,m) or a beta distribution Beta(α , β), with n < m
both uniformly sampled fromU (0, 1) and α , β ∈ {1, ..., 10}. The mis-
coordination payoff α is set to a constant value randomly sampled
from the range of [−0.2, 0] for each payoff matrix.
5.2 Influence of Rewiring Sight
In our optimal rewiring approach, the value of rewiring sight is the
key parameter which may directly influence the performance. We
investigate the performance of varying sight values of K with sev-
eral rewiring costs.5 For learning strategy, we use FP for illustration
and similar results can be observed for other learning strategies
(i.e., JAL or JA-WoLF), which are omitted due to space limitation.
Fig.2(a) shows the average accumulated payoff obtained by each
agent with different cost-sight settings. We can see that the aver-
age payoffs for different costs increase rapidly with the growth
of sight value and reach the peaks when c/K is within the range
of [0.0, 0.2]. Intuitively this indicates that an agent with relatively
4The network topologies of interaction environments are changed along with the
occurrence of dynamic rewirings. Thus, different initial topologies show similar results
in long-term interactions.
5The rewiring costs are usually set to be larger than single-round payoff because
changing topologies is a non-trivial task.
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Figure 2: Average payoff of different rewiring strategies generated in 1000-rounds interactions over 100 randomly initialized
(100,4,12) networks with φ = 0.01.
small sight value is short-sighted and may not be willing to rewire
any high-risk agent (high cost) to maximize its long-term benefits.
This phenomenon can be explained from Eq.9: the index Λ is more
likely to be negative with large c/K which means few rewiring
decisions can be made with our optimal strategy. After the peaks, it
starts to descend with different speed when the value of K further
increases. This phenomenon indicates that extremely large sight
values make optimal estimations become unreliable. This can also
be explained from Eq.9: the small value of c/K leads to the increase
of Λ, and thus increasing the set of candidate agents for rewiring. In
other words, largeK is deemed to be over-optimistic and aggressive
as any connection may be replaced in the future. In the extreme
case where K → ∞, the infinitely long sight makes the rewiring
cost meaningless as c/K → 0.
Based on the above analysis, we can see that given any cost c ,
we should select a reasonable K as the optimal rewiring sight value.
In following experiments, we choose a suitable value of K to let the
value of c/K be within the optimal range of [0.0, 0.2] for different
rewiring costs.
5.3 Performance Comparison of Rewiring
Strategies
To evaluate the performance of our optimal approach, we compare
our rewiring strategy with two benchmark strategies as follows:
• Random (Ran): Random rewiring is included as the baseline
strategy, in which an agent establishes new connection with
a potential peer randomly selected each time.
• K-sight Highest Expect (K-HE): K-HE is a rational benchmark
strategy that rewires the agent with the highest K-round
expected value minus the cost, i.e. maxj ∈O¯ E(x ji ) − c
j
i /K .
To the best of our knowledge, there exist works on rewiring in social
networks, but they use rewiring as an additional mechanism instead
of designing optimal rewiring strategies to facilitate multiagent
coordination under the social learning framework. Thus, most of
them are are vanilla and cannot be directly applied in our context.
We first evaluate the performance of each rewiring strategy in
different interaction environments with varying parameters (x ,y, z)
of networks. Both K-HE and our optimal strategy use the same value
ofK (K = 400) as the rewiring sight value. We simulate 1000-rounds
interactions in pure environments where the population uses the
Table 1: The performance of optimal rewiring strategy and
benchmarks with different topologies c = 20.0 and φ = 0.01
No. (x, y, z) Rew_Stg Avg. Max. Min.
1 (100, 4, 8) Random 978.23 1900.74 355.70
2 (100, 4, 8) K − HE 1146.60 2197.96 358.33
3 (100, 4, 8) Optimal 1342.78 2261.85 1342.78
4 (100, 4, 12) Random 763.93 1383.97 283.87
5 (100, 4, 12) K − HE 1003.46 1979.67 306.71
6 (100, 4, 12) Optimal 1372.66 2437.97 665.78
7 (100, 4, 16) Random 702.26 1290.33 252.51
8 (100, 4, 16) K − HE 991.24 1912.27 324.64
9 (100, 4, 16) Optimal 1377.95 2516.00 650.10
10 (500, 4, 16) Random 694.34 1434.54 169.40
11 (500, 4, 16) K − HE 993.56 2173.42 211.77
12 (500, 4, 16) Optimal 1373.60 2735.48 484.43
13 (500, 8, 16) Random 738.88 1307.37 252.85
14 (500, 8, 16) K − HE 1016.85 1768.48 360.16
15 (500, 8, 16) Optimal 1177.35 1789.12 593.17
16 (1000, 8, 16) Random 740.29 1375.69 217.80
17 (1000, 8, 16) K − HE 1018.53 1801.04 314.75
18 (1000, 8, 16) Optimal 1170.46 1810.58 567.38
same rewiring strategy. The average accumulated payoffs obtained
by agents using different rewiring strategies are shown in Table 1.
First we can observe that our optimal strategy outperforms
benchmark strategies in terms of average, best and worst cases
across all different parameter settings, especially when the size y of
neighborhood is relatively small (each neighbor matters). Second,
another observation we can find in No.1 to 9, is that as the size z
of reachable agents becomes larger, the performance of the two
benchmark strategies decreases, while the optimal strategy still
shows good and robust performance (actually a slight ascending
trend) against the variation of interaction environments. This is
because our optimal strategy is more likely to pick off better peers
when our agents have more rewiring alternatives, which ensures
robust and even better performance. In contrast, random strategy
is more likely to make bad choices. For K-HE strategy, it only fo-
cuses on the highest expected interaction payoff of potential peers
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Figure 3: Analysis of learning strategies in (100,4,12) net-
works with c = 2000.0, φ = 0.0001, K = 10000.0 for optimal
rewiring strategy in pure environments.
regardless of the network dynamics caused by rewiring. Hence the
loss of optimality becomes even worse when facing more choices.
Another observation is that, comparing the results from No.10
to 15, we can see that the average payoff for our optimal strategy
decreases and the performance gap between optimal strategy and
others becomes smaller as the size y of neighborhood becomes
larger. The is because in our experiments, each agent interacts with
a randomly selected neighbor. Thus, even though our approach
always makes the optimal rewiring decision, the expected payoff
during the course of interaction will approach the expectation value
of random interactions with the neighborhood, as the neighborhood
size y approaches infinity. This can be analyzed formally as follows.
For any agent i , let v˜i (Oi ) denotes the agent i’s expected value of
random interactions with neighborhood Oi and naturally we have
v˜i (Oi ) = 1/|Oi |∑j ∈Oi v ji . We can see in Eq.1 v ji = maxm∈Aj um
when p ji = 1, which means agent i and j coordinate on actionm.
Thus, in the uniform distribution case, where um ∼ U (a,b) and
a,b ∼ U (0, 1), we easily have lim |Oi |→∞ E(v˜i (Oi )) → E(U (0, 1)).
Furthermore, we compare the performance of our optimal strat-
egy and existing benchmark strategies in different rewiring cost
settings. The value of sight is set to K = 200 for both K-HE and
the optimal strategy. We vary rewiring cost value of c in the range
of [0.0, 200.0]. Fig.2(b) shows the average accumulated payoffs for
each rewiring strategy in a pure environment. We can see that our
optimal rewiring strategy outperforms others and acquires higher
payoff across almost all c/K value ([0.0, 0.8]). Next we evaluate
our optimal rewiring strategy in a competitive environment where
each agent is randomly assigned a rewiring strategy (from Random,
K-HE and optimal strategy) with equal probabilities and the results
are shown in Fig.2(c). Fig.2(b) and Fig.2(c) are similar and we can
see that our optimal rewiring strategy significantly outperforms
existing benchmark strategies for different c/K settings in competi-
tive environments. As expected, the optimal strategy’s payoff starts
at the peak when the rewiring cost is zero, and decreases gradually
as the cost increases. The obtained payoff slowly declines until
c/K ≈ 0.7, where the rewiring costs are too high and not rewiring
is the optimal choice.
The K-HE strategy ranks the second. It starts with average accu-
mulated payoff near 1200 and drops significantly to the minimum
when c/K ≈ 0.25. The reason why K-HE has a good start is the
initial rewiring cost is negligible even though its rewiring decision
is sub-optimal. As the rewiring cost increases, the performance
gap between K-HE and our optimal strategy becomes even larger.
This is because when c/K is small, there are many rewiring alter-
natives for both K-HE and our optimal strategy. For K-HE, it is
more likely to pick the sub-optimal one while our optimal strat-
egy always chooses the optimal one. Further, K-HE’s performance
gradually improves when c/K further increases and reach the same
level as our optimal strategy when c/K ≥ 0.7. This is because few
alternatives exist for selection as the value of c/K becomes larger
and it is more likely for K-HE to also select the optimal rewiring
action by chance. Therefore, for K-HE strategy, rewiring with ben-
eficial agents is a safer choice for higher rewiring costs because
such agents are sure to give higher payoff; in contrast, rewiring
decisions are not reliable when c/K is within the range of [0.1, 0.5].
Overall, the performance difference between K-HE and our optimal
strategy is significant, which stems from the fact that our optimal
policy takes future interactions into account when exploring the
different potential partners.
The random rewiring method performs the worst since it al-
ways rewires a randomly selected peers. It quickly degenerates and
moves off the chart for higher costs because of the rapid increase
of the total rewiring costs. In addition, we vary the proportions
of agents using K-HE strategy from 10% to 90% for more competi-
tive environments consisting of agents using only K-HE or optimal
strategies, and the results are shown in Fig.2(d). The random strat-
egy is not considered due to its poor performance. We can see our
optimal strategy significantly prevails K-HE over all proportion
values against c/K settings, which indicates our optimal strategy is
robust and can always achieve higher accumulated payoff.
5.4 Performance Analysis of Different
Learning Strategies
We compare the performance of three representative learning strate-
gies: FP, JAL and JA-WoLF. Fig.3(a) shows the dynamics of the av-
erage single-round payoff for different learning strategies. It shows
the agents using FP strategy can fast reach a good payoff level
within 10000 rounds and then stay at near 1.3 after 100000 rounds.
JAL and JA-WoLF start with worse performance but outperform FP
from near 200000th round and maintain a 0.1 lead at the value of
average per-round reward. For further explanation, Fig.3(b) shows
the dynamics of the percentage of agents reaching optimal Nash
equilibrium (OptNE) and sub-optimal equilibrium (SubOptNE) for
above three strategies. We can find that JA-WoLF is the quickest to
reach almost 100%OptNE (≈40000 rounds), followed by JAL (≈60000
rounds). The population of agents using FP shows a quick start but
leads to only over 70% of OptNE (the rest of 17% for SubOptNE)
which results in its poor behavior during long-run interactions in
Fig.3(a). We hypothesize that FP’s bad performance is because its
convergence strategy highly depends on the initial strategies of
players. For example, if two players are assigned a high probabil-
ity of choosing the action which coordinates to the sub-optimal
NE, each of them are going to choose the sub-optimal action as a
best response which will be reinforced gradually and eventually
converge to the sub-optimal NE. In contrast, JAL and JA-WoLF can
always reach almost perfect coordination on the optimal NE.
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we deal with multiagent coordination problem in co-
operative environments under the social learning framework with
limited rewiring chances available. We proposed a new rewiring
strategy which is optimal and efficient for the agents to maximize
accumulated payoff during long-run interactions. Our empirical
results show that our method outperforms other benchmark strate-
gies in both competitive and pure environments. Moreover, our
method is robust under a variety of circumstances. Besides, we ana-
lyzed the comparative performance of three representative learning
strategies (i.e., FP, JAL and JA-WoLF) under our social learning
framework with optimal rewiring. The empirical results show that
JAL and JA-WoLF outperforms FP on both accumulated payoff and
the percentage of times agents reaching the optimal Nash equilibria
(NE). In this paper, we only consider the rewiring problem in coop-
erative MASs. One worthwhile direction is to investigate how this
rewiring strategy can be extended and applied in non-cooperative
MASs. Another research direction is to explicitly consider how to
better utilize the property of the underlying network topology to
further facilitate coordination.
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